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In an empirical survey on pricing, team steffenhagen GmbH analyzed the impact
of the financial and economic crisis 2008 / 2009 on the chemical industry.
80 pricing managers gave insights into the effects of the crisis, the concernment
triggered by the crisis and the counter measures that were employed in the com-
panies.
The analysis uncovers success factors which promise successful pricing in times
of crises. These include, among others, a high pricing performance already before
the crisis, a clear structure of the pricing processes, a result-oriented alignment of
the pricing, a good knowledge of the advantage of the own products in the proces-
ses of the customers and in the competitive environment, as well as pro-active pri-
cing approaches.During the crisis, it is vital to gain more information on the finan-
cial situation of the customers to substantially invest in marketing and distribu-
tion, to limit abatements, and to ensure professionalism in pricing despite the tur-
bulences of the crisis. In summary, these factors denote sufficient reasons for an
increase of professionalism of the pricing.
Ralf Schmidt*
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a new bubble in the Chinese real estate and
share markets – induced by trade cycle policies
– in December 2009. Regardless of whether the
light at the end of the tunnel is only in sight or
already reached, the consequences of the finan-
cial crisis on the chemical industry were serio-
us, and reason enough for team steffenhagen
to investigate the details.
With regard to the financial crisis 2008 /
2009, team steffenhagen’s target was to iden-
tify arising challenges for companies in the che-
mical industry and to assess their impact on the
firms’ pricing strategies. More specifically, the
survey illuminated the following aspects in
detail:
Which pricing strategies did the companies
have before the crisis?
Which impact did the crisis have on the
companies’ pricing strategies?
How did the companies react?
What can we learn from the crisis in terms
of pricing?
Background
Shortly after the first outcomes of the col-
lapse of prices in the American real estate mar-
ket in February 2007, it took about 1.5 years until
the crisis left perceptible marks in the real eco-
nomy and with that also in the chemical indus-
try. Sales and profit collapsed, productions were
closed down, and reduced working hours were
the often documented consequences.
Although it remains unclear whether the cri-
sis is over, many indicators point upwards. As
an example, the orders of industries not direct-
ly linked to the automotive sector are increa-
sing. Temporarily shut down chemical plants
resume production at an increasing rate and
the association of the chemical industry in Ger-
many (VCI) expects a 5% production and 6%
sales growth rate for 2010.
On the other hand, it is still a long way until
the high values of the first half-year in 2008 will
be in reach, and there are already new voices
who indicate the risk of further bubbles. The
weekly German magazine “DieWirtschaftswo-
che”, for example, has already warned against
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Just after the first glimpses of hope seemed
to rise in July 2009 and – in accordance to
Financial Times Germany (09.07.2009 and
22.07.2009) – reliance came back to the che-
mical industry, DSM already called the boom
into question in August 2009. Süd-Chemie
confirmed the negative perspective, too.
However, in September optimism became
accepted on a broader base. For the year 2010,
the VCI, as mentioned in the beginning,
expected a production growth rate of 5% and
a sales growth rate 6%, even if it has been assu-
med on a low base level.
The survey was conducted in the chemical
industry by team steffenhagen during the
summer of 2009, i.e. between the first boom
tendencies and the relapse into negative per-
spectives. So the shock from the crisis was still
enormous, but, dependent on the industry
sector, the first glimpses of hope were obser-
vable.
The survey
In 2005, team steffenhagen was able to unco-
ver many weaknesses in the pricing manage-
ment of companies, who participated in a first
pricing survey focused on the chemical indus-
try. In the current survey, again 80 pricing
managers from different segments of the che-
mical industry gave response to our questi-
ons.
The participants of this survey mainly wor-
ked in the marketing and sales department,
representing companies and departments of
all sizes with different application areas of
chemical products, such as petrochemistry,
plastics, automotive, construction, or nutriti-
on (c.f. Fig.1). Moreover, participating compa-
nies were located in different markets, inclu-
ding the specialty market, the commodity mar-
ket, as well as the so called semi-commodities
market (c.f. Fig.2).
It has to be noted that, although the survey
indeed covers different segments of the che-
mical industry, it cannot raise the claim to be
representative. It seems obvious that the eva-
luations presented in the survey show an
image which is slightly distorted into a posi-
tive direction of the crisis and its consequen-
ces.
The following figure highlights the distribu-
tion of participating firms with regard to size
and business types.
The way into the crisis
In February 2007, the break in US-Ameri-
can real-estate prices left its first traces: The
HSBC Bank in London had to release the first
profit warning in its history because of the
multi-million loan default of the US-daughter
Household. Two weeks later, US-Boss Bobby
Mehta lost his job because of this develop-
ment. Hardly anybody suspected yet one of
the biggest world economic crises was ringed
in.
US-Finance Minister Hank Paulson only tal-
ked about „limited credit problems“. In May
2007, also the Federal Reserve Chairman of the
US Ben Bernanke was sure about the crisis to
be limited to the American real-estate mar-
ket.
How wrong he was became clear in July
2007, when the IKB (Deutsche Industriebank
KG) in Germany was hit, and the KfW bank
group had to bail for 8.1 billion Euros, while
Bear Steams in the USA had to announce two
of its hedge funds as worthless. The customers
of the British investment bank Northern Rock
emptied their accounts in August 2007, until
the British government declared to guarantee
for the deposits.
In 2008, the crisis reached the real econo-
my, and thus, the chemical industry. On Janua-
ry 21st, the DAX lost seven percent in only one
day. Seven months later, also the biggest che-
mical enterprise BASF SE gave warning of hard
times. Contemporaneously with the insolven-
cy of Lehman Brothers, BASF cut back the plas-
tics production to fight against the crisis. Like-
wise, Rhodia closed a polyamide plant in Italy
as part of a huge cost reduction program. Besi-
des Dow that proclaimed the recession in Octo-
ber 2008, several chemical companies in the
US reduced their profit expectations.
The financial crisis turned into a world eco-
nomic crisis. After the automotive sector was
hit first, the automotive supplier industry was
next. In December 2008, TMD Friction was the
first German automotive supplier to apply for
insolvency – the new car sales in Germany col-
lapsed by 25%.
To cope with the crisis, the chemical indus-
try sought to cut back labor costs through redu-
ced production, as for example Bayer or Lan-
xess, or by means of staff reductions, e.g. Du
Pont. In January 2009, Lyondell-Basell got into
financial difficulties, whereas BASF sent 1800
employers into short-time work. In February,
the association of the chemical industry in
Germany (VCI) even referred to a catastrophe.
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Chemistry
30,0 %
Other
26,3 %
Plastics
16,3 %
Automotive
13,8 %
Nutrition
13,8 %
Figure 1 Structure of the participants by industry branches
Figure 2 Structure of the participants by number of employees and business type
Howmany employees are engaded in your
department? (n=80)
<100
100 - 300
301 - 500
501 - 1000
>1000
20 % 43,8 %
17,5 %
7,5 %
11,3 %
Semi-Commodity
33,8 %
Specialty
26,3 %
Commodity
40 %
n=80
<<< Business type: Specialty vs. Commodity 
.........vs. Semi-Commodity
Size of the company or 
rather the department >>>
n = 80
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had a good knowledge of the customer value at
their disposal compared to their competitors.
The orientation of the prices towards the
provided customer value was found in 45% of
the participating companies. However, only 17%
were able to quantify the customer value befo-
re the crisis. Regarding the specialty providers,
there were only 10% able to do so. Commodity
providers revealed – as expected – the lowest
orientation of the prices towards the customer
value as well as the lowest efforts to quantify
the customer value.
In the same way, there was already before
the crisis the need to implement the customer
value in price negotiations: Less than 50% were
able to demonstrate the customer value in price
negotiations before the crisis. Only for 38% the
customer value was at the core of their price
negotiations. 
In terms of the price implementation, it is
striking that around 60% of the companies were
well prepared during the crisis regarding exis-
ting pricing competences and argumentation
support for the sales people. But despite all that,
the targeted price was achieved only by a third
of the companies, and particularly specialty pro-
viders seem to have difficulties here. 
Only 35% of the interviewees reported a pro-
active pricing before the crisis. Apparently, this
is much easier for specialty providers, of which
nearly the half realized a pro-active pricing alrea-
dy before the crisis. 
Regarding price controlling more than 85%
of the companies used systematic and estab-
lished tools before the crisis. When asked about
specific tools, interviewees named only rarely
established tools like price scatter plots or pro-
fitability calculations. They mostly emphasized
general analyses and tools, for example data
bases and benchmarking. 
So it is not very astonishing that only 40%
of the interviewees claimed to be able to pre-
pare better price decisions thanks to speciali-
zed tools before the crisis. Even the impact of
pricing decisions on the own performance is
perceived positively only by 56% of the compa-
nies.  
A kind of oath of disclosure regarding the
price consciousness was revealed in the end of
the survey. The participants were asked for the
biggest lever for the financial result and they
could choose between the price, the variable
costs, the fixed costs, and the sales volume. Sur-
prisingly, only 35% were right and named the
price. 
Against the background of these mediocre
results in terms of pricing quality, the following
Pricing before the crisis
In their self-evaluation, the participants pro-
vide a clear picture in terms of their pricing
behavior: About three quarters of them indica-
ted to have implemented both transparent pri-
cing processes and clearly defined pricing stra-
tegies.
It is precarious though that nearly 70% of
the participating companies (and departments)
still gear their pricing towards maximum EBIT. 
That implies that the majority of companies
are still in danger of taking pricing decisions on
the basis of overhead costs. 
This apprehension is supported by the sur-
vey: For about 50% of the companies the over-
head costs are crucial for price decisions to a
high degree. This is an approach that verifiab-
le leads to wrong decisions! Only for 12% of the
companies the overhead costs play a merited
minor role. 
One can find a strong orientation towards
sales volume or market share within 15% of the
companies. As expected, the suppliers of semi-
commodities and commodities are overrepre-
sented here.
Furthermore, it attracts attention in the ana-
lysis of the survey that the competition orien-
tation comes off badly in terms of pricing. Only
36% of the interviewees claimed that before the
crisis they used systematic methods for compe-
tition analyses.
Before the crisis, a strong orientation towards
the competitors’ prices was crucial for barely a
quarter of the interviewees. That would have
been plausible for specialties, but it is precari-
ous that even with commodities not more than
a third of the involved companies are using sys-
tematic competition analyses. However, 45% of
the commodity providers try to anticipate the
reactions of competitors when setting their pri-
ces. 
Moreover, a quarter of the interviewees revea-
led no competitor orientation regarding the pri-
cing before the crisis.
In terms of customer orientation the situa-
tion was better before the crisis, although furt-
her optimization is essential. 60% of the inter-
viewees had a good knowledge of the benefits
of their products in the processes of their cus-
tomers before the crisis. The least knowledge
about the value in the processes of the custo-
mers could surprisingly be observed in the spe-
cialities market (48%). 
Because of the weaknesses associated with
competitor orientation, only 50% of the inter-
viewees – according to their own statements –
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financial situation. About 42% of them noticed
in this regard an increase in uncertainty since
the beginning of the crisis. Contrasting this,
more than 50% of the less crisis-affected com-
panies felt substantially less insecure. The uncer-
tainty has strongly increased since the begin-
ning of the crisis, especially for commodity pro-
viders. (Annotation: the subjective concernment
was measured as an approval to the statement
“Our company is strongly affected by the cur-
rent economic crisis” on a six-point rating scale.
The answers were clustered into “weakly
affected”, “moderately affected” and “highly
affected”.) 
An increased uncertainty in the judgement
of the financial situation of the customers, which
was detected by nearly all the participants, has
to be added. Specialty providers, however, seem
to assess the situation a bit better. 
Another effect of the crisis can be led back
to the considerably stronger fixation of the nego-
tiation processes on the price, especially at com-
modities and semi-commodities. In this regard
increasing efforts are undertaken to convince
the customer of the added value of the own pro-
ducts. 
The implementation of a successful pricing
in and despite of the crisis is therefore achie-
ved especially in companies which were only
slightly affected by the crisis: While 75% of the
questions have to be asked: To what extent did
the crisis negatively affect the companies? And,
which companies were eminently hit and why? 
The impacts of the crisis
Immediate impacts of the crisis
Certainly, the primary impact of the crisis
was the customers’ reluctance to buy. Declining
demands and quantities of sales are on the 1st
place of our survey in the “charts” of the dis-
tinct changes contingent upon the crisis. More
than a third spontaneously thought of this when
they were asked for the clearest changes cau-
sed by the crisis. In terms of internal consequen-
ces, on the contrary, the focus on costs remains
unchallenged on the first place (11%).
Both facts are not very remarkable. Elsewhe-
re it was reported that sales collapsed by 50%
(or in single cases even up to 80%) and that cost
cutting programs were at the top of any firm’s
agenda. Because of this development more than
a third of the interviewees assessed themsel-
ves as being highly affected by the crisis. A quar-
ter of the participants were on the contrary only
weakly affected (cf. Fig.3).
The companies that were according to their
statements strongly affected by the crisis like-
wise felt strongly insecure regarding the own
How are the companies affected by the crisis?
moderately affected
39.2 %
highly affected
35,4 %
weakly affected
25,3 %
More than one third of the companies participating in the study
....are highly affected by the crisis.n=79 (once “not reported”)
Figure 3 Subjective concernment by the crisis
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weakly affected companies implemented a suc-
cessful pricing, the ratio decreases for highly
affected companies to a maximum of 50%. In
regard to the type of business, it is remarkable
that commodity providers reveal the most dif-
ficulties. However, 44% of them believe that
they have a successful pricing in the crisis. 
A vicious circle is initiated. Especially not
well-prepared companies regarding the pricing
will be affected by the crisis. The concernment
is illustrated by greater uncertainty about the
own situation and the situation of the custo-
mers. If this uncertainty is followed by a stron-
ger price fixation resulting from incompetent
acting on the market, the concern will increase
even more. Accordingly,  successful pricing will
be impossible and, in turn, the sensitivity of
firms against crisis-induced threats will increa-
se. Against this background, an accurate over-
view of the factors, which increase the concern-
ment and in the worst case denote first the step
into this vicious circle, are worth it. 
Therefore, the question arises which factors
lead to a higher or high concernment. 
Where and when is the concernment 
eminently high? 
The diversification of the concernment into
industry sectors was expectable. We could find
high concernment especially in companies which
supply the automotive sector as well as the plas-
tic sector. Following the motto “people will
always eat“ we find only a slight concernment
in companies with customers affiliated to the
nutrition industry.
Surprisingly clear was the difference bet-
ween specialty and commodity or semi-com-
modity providers. Only 14% of the specialty pro-
viders are strongly concerned, while the share
runs up to 38% for semi-commodity providers
and up to even 48% for commodity providers.
Especially a high market transparency and low
differentiation ability seem to be the driving
factors which make them vulnerable to the cri-
sis. 
Since less concerned companies can be found
in the less price-driven sectors, we conclude that
less price-driven industries denote a solid mar-
ket even in the crisis. 
Which countermeasures did the companies
in the chemical industry employ to protect them-
selves from the effects of the crisis? 
This question will be pursued in the follo-
wing for the different phases of the pricing pro-
cess (cf. Fig. 5). 
Figure 4 Insecurities about the own financial situation in dependence to the concernment by the crisis 
Is your own financial situation more or less affected by insecurities
since the economic crisis?
moderately 
affected
n = 19
highly affected
n = 24
weakly affected
n = 7
58,3 % 41,7 %
84,2 % 5,3%
42,9 %42,9 %
10,5 %
14,3 %
0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 %
much less less more much more
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Strategic countermeasures and measures of
base price decisions 
Due to the crisis, participating companies
are now comparatively more oriented towards
their competitors, they have enforced the
structuring of their pricing processes and they
conclude contracts with shorter durations: 
Increased competitor orientation: Since the
beginning of the crisis more than 80% of the
interviewees orientated their price decisions
more towards their competitors. 
Enforced structuring of pricing processes:
Three out of four companies have enforced
the structure of their pricing processes since
the beginning of the crisis. Every forth com-
pany even indicated a considerably higher
structuring.
Shorter contract duration (especially at com-
modities): Overall, more than 85% of the
interviewees rely on shortened contract dura-
tions. With reference to commodity provid-
ers, now even 95% employ shorter contract
durations. 
Regarding the question, if companies have
parted from unprofitable business segments in
consequence of the crisis, we once again iden-
tified two groups. 
Measures at pricing decisions 
The following reactions were apparent regar-
ding pricing decisions: 
In correspondence to the tendency of shor-
ter contract durations, more than 80% imple-
mented more short-dated price alignments
since the beginning of the crisis. This ten-
dency is very high for commodity providers
and companies with a low pricing perfor-
mance. (Annotation: The pricing performance
was deduced as an indirect indicator out of
different questions of the questionnaire.)
More than 75% reacted on the crisis by means
of more price reductions to keep up the sales
volume. Even if this reaction is rarely employ-
ed by specialty providers, this reflex has to
be scrutinized critically: 
On the one hand the outstanding importan-
ce of the price advises caution. 
Furthermore, the question arises, if the resul-
ting price wars are grounded on a real
demand in times of the crisis-induced decrea-
se of needs. Does it make any sense to fight
with reduced prices for a demand which does
not exist anymore? 
Besides that, price reductions can be easily
Which countermeasures were 
employed? 
Countermeasures related to costs and infor-
mation procurement 
The reduction of costs is one of the first cri-
sis-induced reflexes. The following means to
reduce the costs were used intensively: 
 Stronger focus on production costs: 95% of
the participating companies have urged their
efforts to optimize the production costs since
the beginning of the crisis. A third of the
interviewees even reported strongly enfor-
ced measures. 
More pressure on the commodity prices:
There is no exception here. The crisis indu-
ced all companies to increase the pressure
on their suppliers to reduce commodity pri-
ces. Remarkable strong pressure was exer-
ted by providers of commodities and semi-
commodities. 
More pressure on payment terms: More than
72% also employed shortened periods of pay-
ment, which increased the burdens on the
suppliers even more. Especially commodity
providers are not very willing to compromi-
ses. 
Contrasting cost related saving effects, invest-
ments in information procurement are vital. The
following investments were enforced since the
beginning of the crisis:
More market intelligence / market observa-
tion: All participating companies conduct
more market observations since the begin-
ning of the crisis to reduce existing uncer-
tainties. There are also no companies which
have not enhanced observations of the com-
petitors.
All interviewees are using more external
information sources since the beginning of
the crisis to be able to more reliably estima-
te the financial situation of their customers.  
More resources in marketing & sales: While
a third of the companies are saving their
money, two thirds invest more into marke-
ting and sales than before the crisis. 
We also detected a polarization of compa-
nies with regard to the investments in techni-
cal staff. While slightly more than half of the
companies tend to reduce investments in tech-
nical staff, the “smaller half” tends to expand
their investments. 
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cing performance protects from the effects of
the crisis. The amount of companies that were
only slightly affected by the crisis is as double
as high for companies with a high pricing per-
formance (29%) than for companies with a low
pricing performance (14%). And you don’t even
have to be counted to the best in pricing to pre-
pare well for crisis times. Even companies with
a medium pricing performance (26%) are only
weakly affected. 
A high pricing performance therefore leads
to being less affected by the crisis. A low pricing
performance before the crisis on the other hand
appears to be enforcing the crisis related uncer-
tainties, for example regarding the estimation
of the own financial situation. 
A high pricing performance allows for success-
ful pricing even in the crisis
Companies with a lower pricing performance
are not only hit stronger by the crisis, but they
have also more difficulties in or despite the cri-
sis to implement a successful pricing. Accordin-
gly, only 40% of the companies with a low pri-
cing performance are able to  implement a suc-
cessfull pricing, while 55% of the companies
with a medium or high pricing performance  are
able to do so.
Moreover, the companies that  reveal a suc-
cessful pricing even in the crisis are not hit by
the crisis that strong. The negative impact of
the crisis is further reduced by a successful pri-
cing. 
Pro-active and clearly structured pricing stra-
tegies are paying off 
Our survey emphasizes how important pro-
activity is for pricing: With increasing pro-acti-
vity the effects of the crisis decline. Highly
affected companies claim that their own price
behavior is only for 25% distinctly pro-active.
Therefore the weakly affected companies indi-
cate a percentage of 45%. 
A stronger structuring of the pricing proces-
ses during the crisis results in more relief. Only
weakly affected companies have more structu-
re in the pricing since the beginning of the cri-
sis. On the contrary, highly affected companies
are losing more than 42% of structure in their
pricing processes. 
Enforcement of the market related activities
brings success in the crisis 
Companies, which were hit only weakly by
copied by competitors. While price wars are
often initiated by price reductions, firms often
employ this mechanism without a verifica-
tion, if there is a realistic chance to win based
on the own costs position, and with fatal con-
sequences for the own profitability. 
On the other hand, nearly 25% of the que-
ried companies are able to enforce higher
prices since the beginning of the crisis; even
36% of the specialty providers are able to do
so. 
More than 57% of the companies separate
the pricing of service features to a lesser
extent. On the contrary, other companies
reacted by means of an enforced direct pri-
cing of the services. 
Measures of price implementation and price
controlling 
In order to meet the challenge of price enfor-
cements successfully, 80% of the participating
companies are using more and more trainings
of their own sales employees. 
Nearly a third of the companies do not use
variable remuneration models that are in line
with the price implementation to incentivize
sales people. Within much more than a third of
the companies, which work with performance-
based remuneration models, the performance
criteria have no direct connection with the out-
come. 
92% of the companies, which use more deci-
sion supporting tools, rely on a more intense
price controlling. However, the question about
the professionalism of these efforts remains
unanswered. 
With all used measures and reactions on the
crisis the question about the efficiency arises.
Which success factors can be derived for a pri-
cing in the crisis? 
Success factors for a pricing in the cri-
sis
A high pricing performance is the best preven-
tion for a crisis
Of course a high pricing performance, per
definition, provides the best premises to con-
trol the most important outcome driver – the
price. This is not very surprising.  
The survey proves that a high pricing perfor-
mance is indeed the best premise to survive a
crisis like the world and economic crisis which
started in 2007/2008. In conformity with the
rule „Prevention is better than cure“, a high pri-
43
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Structure your pricing processes! The stron-
ger the structure of the pricing processes,
the smaller the effects of a crisis on your pro-
cesses. 
Align your pricing with the results and the
really relevant costs! Consequently use a pri-
cing that is orientated towards the margi-
nal income and avoid grounding your pricing
decisions on fixed costs, EBIT or market sha-
res. This also offers you further protection
on wrong decisions in the crisis (and, of cour-
se, already before the crisis). 
Care for a good knowledge of your own pro-
ducts in the processes of your customers and
in the competitive environment! This also
will result in less vulnerability in the crisis. 
Focus on pro-active pricing! Pro-active pri-
cing also leads to less vulnerability in the cri-
sis. 
Increase the competitor orientation of your
pricing! More orientation on the competi-
tors leads to less effects of the crisis on you
as well. 
Focus on a systematic price monitoring and
controlling for a better preparation of price
decisions! Less problems result in crisis times. 
Finally, care quickly for a systematic profes-
sionalization of the pricing, because after
the crisis is before the crisis. No instrument
has a comparable direct and strong impact
on the result than pricing! 
What has to be done in the next crisis? 
If the next tangible economic or sector cri-
sis knocks on your door, you can derive the fol-
lowing suggestions from our survey:
Use systematic information sources about
the financial situation of your customers in
the crisis! Fewer problems will affect you in
the crisis. 
During the crisis, invest also or especially
more into marketing and sales!
Be cautious and conservative in terms of price
reductions, also in the crisis! More crisis-indu-
ced price reductions lead to more impact of
the crisis. 
Don’t let the pricing performance suffer!
Companies, which are even in a crisis able to
implement a successful pricing, won’t be hit
so hard by the crisis. 
Conclusion
It is undeniable that the economic and world
crisis had and still has a dramatic impact on the
the crisis, 
are using, by trend, more information sour-
ces for the assessment of the financial situa-
tion of the customers since the beginning of
the crisis, 
invest much more into marketing and sales
resources,
orient the prices more towards their compe-
titors since the crisis started,
are aware of the value of their own products
in the competitive environment as well as in
the processes of the customers and
experience much less increase in the com-
petitive pressure than strongly affected com-
panies. 
Price controlling and result-orientation. Even
in the crisis. 
Companies that were only weakly affected
by the crisis, enforce the exit from non-profi-
table deals more than highly affected compa-
nies. Crisis-torn companies use more price
reductions since the beginning of the crisis, to
be able to keep up the sales. 
So, it doesn’t surprise that among the stron-
gly crisis-affected companies, we find a lot of
companies with pricing strategies geared
towards the maximization of the EBIT (82% ver-
sus 63% of less strong affected companies). The
overemphasis of not decision relevant fixed costs
leads apparently towards wrong decisions. 
The companies however, who were well pre-
pared for price decisions with systematic price
controlling, until the crisis began, were hit less
hard by the crisis: Only 35% of the strongly
affected companies used such a systematic price
controlling, while 53% of the less affected com-
panies did so, too. 
Lessons learned? What we should learn
from the crisis
What you should do right now and therefore
before the next crisis
The results of the survey give clear evidence
on pricing-related needs for optimization that
should be taken seriously. 
The survey results suggest how to prepare
yourself for the next crisis: 
Care for a high pricing performance already
before the crisis! A high pricing performance
will substantially reduce the effects of the
next crisis. 
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no other instrument has a comparable effect
on the results than pricing.
Therefore implement as quickly as possible
a consistent professional price management: 
Value-driven instead of cost-based pricing
Focus on profits instead of volume or mar-
ket share orientation
Pro-active instead of reactive pricing
Unfortunately there are still too many com-
panies – also in the chemical industry – who
have not yet implemented these principles and
the identified success factors of this survey con-
sistently and consequently. This is also shown
by the results of the survey.
The following figure summarizes the syste-
matic pricing process in an overview. At the bot-
tom you can find measures for the different sta-
ges of the pricing process. 
Strategic alignment
Strategic binding of the pricing
Clarification of the business model
Strategic objectives
Price / Value positioning
Behavior in cost / performance competition
and in the product life cycle 
Base price decisions
Clarification: Value advantage in the compe-
companies in the chemical industry. Decline in
sales, shutdowns of production sites, profit set-
backs, job cuts and insolvencies didn’t spare the
chemical industry. 
The survey results suggest that the percei-
ved effects were especially high for manufactur-
ers of commodities and semi-commodities as
well as for companies who supply the automo-
tive industry. 
But the situation is not hopeless at all: Espe-
cially a professional price management also in
times of crises offers good possibilities to sur-
vive the crisis without unnecessary losses. 
The survey shows that a high pricing perfor-
mance indeed protects from fatal effects. The
companies, who are able to stick to their pricing
even in a crisis, are less affected by it. 
A pro-active pricing, a professional price con-
trolling and an enforced supply of the pricing
process with information of customers, of their
financial situation, and the value of the own
products additionally act as a brake on the cri-
sis-related risks. 
The consistent optimization of the price
management in all stages of the pricing pro-
cess offers the best equipment for the purpose
of prevention to protect yourself from the effects
of the crisis, for the purpose of a better and
result-oriented steering through the crisis and
of course beyond the times of crises, because
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Figure 5 Systematic pricing: The pricing cycle
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tition (e.g. PSR2)
Definition of pricing methods (e.g. Value Pri-
cing, Competitive Pricing, Performance Pric-
ing, price tactics) 
Price definitions
Pricing guidelines
Pricing rules
Exact price calculation 
Definition of the price range and price boun-
daries
Unit price decisions and transaction prices 
Incoterms 
Price contracts
Price implementation
Price argumentation and price negotiations
Pricing and negotiation trainings (incl. MBTI®)
Roles & Responsibilities
Pricing processes
Incentive systems
Price controlling & monitoring
Price reporting
Tools for price controlling
Pricing Toolbox
Price -, quantities-, and CM-monitoring
CM-simulator
Price Scatter Plots (price clouds)
Customer Box Plots
Cost Development Calculator
Waterfall Analyses
Customer result calculation
Knowledge Toolbox
